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INTRODUCTION 
One of the key features of American corporate law is that states are free to 
chart their own courses.1 This freedom has led to fierce competition for corpo-
rate charters and the tax revenues they generate,2 a competition Delaware clear-
ly has won.3 Home to more than one million active firms,4 Delaware has more 
corporate entities than people5 and is home to nearly half of U.S. public com-
panies,6 including 66 percent of the Fortune 500 companies.7 In 2015, Dela-
ware firms accounted for nearly 99percent of U.S. Initial Public Offerings.8 By 
virtue of this dominance, Delaware corporate law commands unrivaled respect, 
and many states routinely look to Delaware when crafting their own corporate 
laws.9 However, some states have attempted to differentiate their corporate law 
 
1  Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and inves-
tors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where feder-
al law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, 
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993). 
2  See ROMANO, supra note 1; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255 (1977). But see 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439, 468 (2001) (arguing, based on the shareholder primacy ideology, that 
corporate law is mostly uniform across developed market jurisdictions, suggesting there is 
no longer competition between states). 
3  See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 38. 
4  See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 1, https://co 
rp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015 Annual Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3YG-3YAY]. 
5  Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-t 
ax-haven.html [https://perma.cc/73Z9-DE4C]. 
6  Id. 
7  BULLOCK, supra note 4, at 1. 
8  Id. 
9  See, e.g., Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland, 992 P.2d 216, 218 (Kan. 1999) 
(citation omitted) (explaining Kansas courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); 
Oliveira v. Sugarman, 152 A.3d 728, 736 n.4 (Md. 2017) (explaining Maryland courts look 
to Delaware in matters of corporate law); Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 567 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explaining New Jersey courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate 
law); Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Props., LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2014) (explaining Tennessee courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); In re F5 
Networks, Inc., 207 P.3d 433, 439 (Wash. 2009) (explaining Washington courts look to Del-
aware in matters of corporate law); Notz v. Everett Smith Grp., Ltd., 764 N.W.2d 904, 915 
(Wis. 2009) (explaining Wisconsin courts look to Delaware in matters of corporate law); see 
also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443–44 (1992) (“Other states . . . 
have followed Delaware in adopting various legal rules. Delaware has played a major role in 
the spread of innovations concerning a range of corporate law issues . . . .”). 
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from Delaware’s, hoping to capture some of the market for corporate charters 
by offering alternative and, in their view, better laws.10 
One area in which states have sought to deviate from Delaware’s approach 
is in defining the corporation’s central purpose and the constituencies corporate 
directors may consider when setting corporate policy.11 In Delaware, the courts 
have crafted a rule that puts shareholder interests first.12 Often referred to as the 
shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization13 standard, the gen-
eral principle is that corporate managers and directors must put the interests of 
shareholders above all others.14 To the extent that directors may consider other 
constituencies, they may consider them only as a means to the end of increasing 
shareholder welfare.15 Other states have been more permissive, opting to allow 
managers and directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituen-
cies—like employees, creditors, and local communities—as well.16 
This article focuses on Nevada and its effort to permit corporate directors 
to consider other constituencies in fulfilling their fiduciary duties. While the 
Nevada Legislature has repeatedly enacted legislation to accomplish this goal, 
the state and federal courts continue to look to Delaware law and have improp-
erly imported Delaware’s shareholder primacy rules into Nevada corporate 
law.17 This creates a number of problems. First, the idea that a single trial judge 
or four justices of the Nevada Supreme Court can ignore Nevada’s corporate 
law, and instead rely on Delaware’s vision of good corporate governance, vio-
lates basic premises of democracy.18 Second, reliance on Delaware law upsets 
parties’ expectations about what the law actually is in Nevada—making it diffi-
cult for firms to build meaningful plans for future investment.19 Finally, it de-
feats the promise of a federal system in which states may experiment and inno-
vate with different laws.20 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly explains the business judg-
ment rule and the higher standards of review by which Delaware courts enforce 
shareholder primacy in the takeover context. This Part highlights how Nevada 
law differs from Delaware’s and how courts in Nevada have applied the wrong 
standards in deciding corporate disputes. Part II explains how many states have 
rejected these standards; it illustrates that states can and do diverge from Dela-
ware’s shareholder primacy norm. Part III tells Nevada’s story: how Nevada’s 
 
10  See discussion infra Part III. 
11  See discussion infra Part III. 
12  See discussion infra Part I. 
13  Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1951–
52 (2018). 
14  See discussion infra Part I. 
15  See discussion infra Part I. 
16  See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
17  See discussion infra Part III. 
18  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
19  See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
20  See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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legislature has sought to reject Delaware’s shareholder primacy standard and 
how the Nevada courts continue to rely on Delaware law. Part III also presents 
some recent amendments to Nevada’s corporate law, intended, once and for all, 
to make clear that courts should look to the plain language of Nevada’s statutes, 
not to Delaware law. Part IV discusses the implications of courts ignoring state 
law. Part V makes some tentative suggestions on how to constrain judges and 
induce them to follow the law in Nevada. Finally, this article concludes with a 
call to action, urging Nevada’s state and federal judges to take a closer look at 
Nevada corporate law and to rethink their rote reliance on Delaware corporate 
law. 
I. DELAWARE’S STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 
Under Delaware corporate law, “directors owe [] fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care to the corporation” and its stockholders.21 The duty of care, simply 
stated, requires directors to exercise the care that a reasonable person “would 
exercise under similar circumstances.”22 The duty of loyalty requires directors 
to put the interests of the corporation and its stockholders above their own.23 
These fiduciary duties, which are considered the primary tool for enforcing 
shareholder primacy, are not creatures of statute but of common law, “finding 
their roots and subsequent development in the . . . courts.”24 
One difficulty in pursuing fiduciary duty claims is that directors control the 
corporations they oversee, including the decision to sue when the corporation 
has been damaged.25 Directors who breach their fiduciary duties to their corpo-
rations are unsurprisingly loath to sue themselves, and it often falls to share-
holders to step into their shoes and file derivative actions on behalf of the cor-
porations they own.26 When shareholders bring a derivative suit for breach of 
the duties of loyalty or care, Delaware courts distinguish “between the standard 
 
21  Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989);Polk v. Good, 
507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986). 
22  1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 109 (5th ed.1998). 
23  Id. at 263. 
24  Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 271, 295 (2014). 
25  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2019) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.120 (2019) (“Subject only to such limitations as may 
be provided by this chapter, or the articles of incorporation of the corporation, the board of 
directors has full control over the affairs of the corporation.”); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 811, 813 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of 
the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation.”). 
26  See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 482, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019). 
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of conduct and the standard of review.”27 The standard of conduct describes the 
behavior that the law normatively expects of directors.28 The standard of review 
describes the test that courts use to evaluate director liability.29 In most areas of 
the law, the two standards are the same;30 in Delaware corporate law, they are 
not.31 This Part summarizes some key standards of review that Delaware courts 
use to evaluate director liability when shareholders sue for breach of the duty of 
care or loyalty, a necessary backdrop for highlighting how Nevada law differs 
from Delaware law and how courts in Nevada have applied the wrong stand-
ards. 
A. The Business Judgment Rule and Its Limits 
The business judgment rule, under which courts afford great deference to 
director decision-making, “is the default standard of review” for corporate de-
cisions in Delaware corporate law.32 In its most widely quoted formulation, the 
business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”33 
To set aside this presumption, plaintiffs must show gross negligence or corpo-
rate waste.34 Otherwise, the rule protects directors from personal liability.35 Put 
simply, the business judgment rule is a powerful rule of judicial restraint by 
which courts will not inquire into a board’s business decisions—even ones that 
 
27  Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 (Del. Ch. 2014); see also William T. Allen 
et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corpora-
tion Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 867 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function over Form]. 
28  Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 27, at 867. 
29  Id. at 868. 
30  For example, the standard of conduct that tort law expects of individuals is to act reasona-
bly; the standard of review in a tort suit against an individual is whether the individual acted 
reasonably. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437 (1993). 
31  See Chen, 87 A.3d at 667. For a discussion of the policy reasons for the divergence be-
tween the standard of conduct and the standard of review, see William T. Allen et. al., Rea-
ligning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Cri-
tique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
449, 454 (2002). 
32  Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also Anthony 
J. Dennis, Assessing the Fallout: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. and Dela-
ware’s Unocal Standard of Review, 17 J. CORP. L. 347, 350 (1992). 
33  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). 
34  See id.; Dennis, supra note 32, at 351. In Delaware corporate law, “gross negligence 
means reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or 
actions which are without the bounds of reason.” In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 
640, 652 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citations omitted). Nevada’s threshold to overcome the busi-
ness judgment rule is even higher than Delaware’s, requiring “intentional misconduct, fraud 
or a knowing violation of law” on the part of directors. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7)(b)(2) 
(2019). But see FDIC v. Johnson, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1292 (D. Nev. 2014). 
35  McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000). 
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are unreasonable—absent a showing that the board was grossly negligent or 
wasteful.36 
Of course, like any legal doctrine, the business judgment rule has its limits. 
Delaware courts have conditioned application of the business judgment rule on 
undivided loyalty.37 Thus, where shareholders can show that a business deci-
sion involved self-dealing or bad faith, Delaware law requires directors to 
prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation.38 In other words, 
rather than finding refuge in the business judgment rule, the directors must 
prove that the deal was “as favorable [to the corporation] as could have [other-
wise] been achieved in an arms-length [transaction] subject to market competi-
tion.”39 Directors who fail to carry this heavy burden face personal liability.40 
B. Delaware’s Enhanced Standards for Takeovers 
While the business judgment rule remains the bedrock standard of review 
under Delaware corporate law,41 Delaware courts have developed more strin-
gent standards for director decision-making during hostile takeovers.42 The 
1980s witnessed a veritable flood of hostile takeovers that led to one of the 
 
36  Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 27, at 868. Several policy rationales support 
the business judgment rule. One well-known justification recognizes that courts—composed 
of legal professionals—are ill-equipped institutions to second-guess business decisions made 
by independent directors. See Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1325 (7th Cir. 1985). A 
second justification recognizes that risk-taking is an essential feature of any business ven-
ture. By insulating directors from personal liability for decisions that turn out poorly, the 
business judgment rule encourages the kind of informed beneficial risk-taking that leads to 
innovation. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Regular (Judicial) Order as Equity: The Enduring Value 
of the Distinct Judicial Role, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 106–07 (2014). 
37  Avande, Inc. v. Evans, No. 2018-0203-AGB, 2019 WL 3800168, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 
2019) (citations omitted); cf. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The ‘busi-
ness judgment rule’ . . . yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is de-
signed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of self-interest.’ ”). 
38  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that transactions taken in bad 
faith violate the duty of loyalty); see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 
439 (Del. 1971) (analyzing a showing of inequitable corporate decision-making). But see 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2010) (providing two routes—ratification by a disinter-
ested board majority and ratification by informed stockholders—by which a self-dealing 
transaction can avoid entire fairness). 
39  Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in 
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 643 (2010). 
40  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 349, 361 (Del. 1993); see also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (West 2019) (providing that corporate charters cannot in-
clude provisions limiting director liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (West 2011) (providing that corporations cannot indemnify directors for 
acting in bad faith). 
41  See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122, 125 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
42  See Richard C. Brown, The Role of the Courts in Hostile Takeovers, 93 DICK. L. REV. 
195, 225 (1989). 
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most remarkable industrial restructurings in the history of corporate America.43 
Lax antitrust policy, paired with the rise in institutional and junk-bond financ-
ing,44 opened the market for corporate control to a new class of entrepreneurs: 
the corporate raider.45 By the end of the decade, over a trillion dollars in assets 
had changed hands,46 and nearly 30 percent of Fortune 500 companies had been 
acquired.47 Unsurprisingly, the dramatic uptick in takeovers sent shockwaves 
through boardrooms; directors feared losing the control over the companies 
they ran.48 This, in turn, inspired corporate lawyers to develop novel takeover 
defenses designed to stymie unwanted acquisition, the most notable being the 
“poison pill.”49 When shareholders later sued directors for using these defenses, 
Delaware courts had to determine whether such actions breached the directors’ 
fiduciary duties.50 
Delaware courts recognized that directors of target companies face a natu-
ral tension when confronting a hostile takeover.51 While shareholders see the 
immediate benefit of having their stock bought at a premium,52 directors are 
regularly replaced.53 Corporate directors might resist a takeover not because it 
is in the best interest of the stockholders or the corporation but because it might 
cost them their positions.54 In other words, they have an implicit conflict of in-
 
43  See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity 
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–24 
(2001). 
44  See ROBERT M. COLLINS, TRANSFORMING AMERICA: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE 
REAGAN YEARS 111–12 (2007). 
45  William B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial Perspec-
tive, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 45, 47. 
46  COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112. 
47  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and 
Implications, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 51, 53 (1991); see also COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112 
(discussing the 1980’s takeover boom); Allan Kanner, Protecting Workers from Unlawful 
Interference with Their Jobs, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 171, 175–76 (1992) (same). 
48  See COLLINS, supra note 44, at 112 (discussing the 1980’s takeover boom). 
49  “A poison pill is a defensive mechanism . . . [that permits] all existing shareholders, ex-
cept for the would-be acquiror, [to] get the right to purchase debt or stock of the target at a 
discount.” Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Share-
holders’ Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REV. 129, 129–30 n.6 (1991). 
50  See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 494–95 (2001). 
51  See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facil-
itating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 45 (1982); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, Seek-
ing Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 64 
(1982). 
52  See Sara B. Moeller et al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 
201, 220 (2004) (explaining that the average premiums paid to shareholders for public acqui-
sitions are 68 percent for large firms and 62 percent for small firms). 
53  See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 52. 
54  In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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terest. Against this backdrop, the Delaware Supreme Court issued two seminal 
decisions, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.55 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings,56 which together set forth standards of review for 
directors facing a takeover. 
1. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
Unocal involved an unsolicited two-tiered offer57 by famed corporate raid-
er T. Boone Pickens to acquire Unocal Corporation in 1985.58 The Unocal 
board rejected Pickens’s offer as “grossly inadequate,” choosing instead to en-
gage in a discriminatory self-tender.59 The goal of the self-tender was to fend 
off Pickens’s bid by giving shareholders a higher-priced alternative for their 
shares.60 Pickens sued to enjoin the self-tender, arguing that the Unocal direc-
tors violated their fiduciary duties to shareholders by implementing the defen-
sive tactic.61 
Though the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately found in favor of the Un-
ocal board,62 the court acknowledged that takeovers involve an “omnipresent 
specter” of director self-interest.63 The court sought to mitigate this conflict by 
crafting, and then applying, an innovative new standard of review.64 Under the 
terms of the now famous Unocal “enhanced” standard, directors are required to 
show that their defensive measures to thwart acquisition: (1) were in response 
to a legitimate corporate threat, and (2) were proportional to that threat.65 To 
meet its burden under the first prong, a target board must in good faith “articu-
 
55  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
56  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
57  “A two-tiered tender offer is one in which the [raider]” makes a bid for the target corpora-
tion by first offering to buy only enough shares to get a majority holding of the target. E. An-
thony Lauerman, Comment, Takeovers—Delaware Court Opens the Door for ESOPs as De-
fensive Mechanisms to Unsolicited Takeovers: Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 
16 J. CORP. L. 143, 154 n.100 (1990). Once the raider has control of the target, the remaining 
shareholders are “squeeze[d]-out” in the back end of the merger by being forced to accept a 
lower price for their stock. Id. at 156 n. 120. This tender offer method has the effect of re-
ducing holdout costs for the raider because shareholders fear being forced to sell in “the back 
end of the transaction.” Id. at 154 n.100. 
58  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. 
59  Id. at 950. A self-tender is a “variant form of [a] stock repurchase,” under which a target 
corporation “commences an offer to purchase . . . its own stock,” as the name suggests. R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.44 (3d ed. Supp. 2019). The self-tender has a number of ef-
fects that tend to thwart a hostile takeover, including making the hostile bid more expensive 
and burdening the target corporation with substantial debt. Id. 
60  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. 
61  Id. at 949, 953. 
62  Id. at 958. 
63  Id. at 954. 
64  See id. at 954–55. 
65  See id. at 955. 
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late some legitimate threat” to corporate interests.66 The key inquiry under the 
second prong is whether the board’s defensive measures were animated primar-
ily by a desire to eliminate the corporate threat, rather than by a desire to pre-
serve director control.67 If a board can meet this two-part burden, its actions are 
“entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule,”68 and the burden 
shifts back to the shareholder to show gross negligence or corporate waste.69 
2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 
The second case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,70 
also arose from a common takeover situation: an initial hostile tender offer, fol-
lowed by a friendly bid from a white knight71 solicited by the target corpora-
tion, and numerous subsequent rounds of bidding.72 The takeover battle began 
in June 1985 when Pantry Pride made a hostile offer to buy Revlon with the ul-
timate goal of breaking the company up and selling off its assets—a buyout 
known as a bust-up takeover.73 The Revlon board initially rebuffed Pantry 
Pride’s offer.74 But when Pantry Pride increased its bid price to $56.25, the 
Revlon board, intending to block Pantry Pride’s acquisition, accepted a buyout 
proposed by Forstmann Little & Co. for $57.25 per share75 Undeterred, Pantry 
Pride raised its bid price to $58.00 and sued to enjoin Revlon’s transaction with 
Forstmann.76 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Revlon board breached its fidu-
ciary duties to shareholders by not attaining the highest price possible in the 
sale of the corporation.77 The court then proceeded to introduce a new standard 
of review which “significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the 
Unocal standards.”78 Put simply, Revlon provides that once a board initiates an 
active bidding process, or a change in corporate control becomes inevitable, the 
 
66  Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
67  See id. 
68  Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989); see also Par-
amount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 
958. 
69  Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). 
70  “The nominal plaintiff, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., [wa]s the controlling 
stockholder of Pantry Pride.” Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 176 n.1 (Del. 1986). 
71  “In corporation law . . . a ‘white knight’ is a friendly alternative partner who rescues the 
target company from the purported clutches of a hostile bidder.” Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 
A.2d 1131, 1136 n.12 (Del. 1990) (citation omitted). 
72  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 982 (1992). 
73  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176–77, 180–81. 
74  See id. at 177. 
75  Id. at 177–79. 
76  Id. at 179. 
77  Id. at 182. 
78  Id. 
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board’s actions are “judged against the sole objective of securing the best im-
mediate value” for shareholders.79 As a practical matter, this means directors 
can no longer consider the long-term interests of the corporation or other con-
stituencies.80 For example, a board “cannot prefer one deal over another be-
cause [it] believe[s] that a buyer [who offers a lower price has a] business plan 
that is better for [non-stockholder] constituencies, such as the employees.”81 
When Revlon’s enhanced standard is invoked, directors are reduced to nothing 
more than faithful auctioneers. 
But Revlon effected a more far-reaching change outside the realm of take-
overs by shedding light on a fundamental question in corporate law: what is the 
core purpose of the for-profit corporation? Do corporations exist solely to max-
imize shareholder wealth? If so, over what time horizon? Or may corporations 
take other interests essential to the corporation’s long-term success into ac-
count? The answer after Revlon, at least in Delaware, appears to be that corpo-
rations exist to maximize shareholder wealth, and directors must further that 
end, at least in takeover situations.82 
A recent empirical study by Professor Robert Rhee on the status of share-
holder primacy in American corporate law found that, before 1985, Delaware 
“courts were virtually silent on the concept of shareholder primacy.”83 But after 
Revlon “courts began to opine on shareholder primacy [outside the takeover 
context] and the trend has been unabated since . . . .”84 Rhee concludes that 
“[c]ourts have legitimized and imposed the obligation to maximize shareholder 
profit across the entire spectrum of managerial decision making.”85 While cor-
porate scholars have long debated, and continue to debate, the normative merit 
of shareholder primacy,86 Professor Rhee’s study is consistent with the leading 
academic view that shareholder primacy is the norm in Delaware.87 For in-
 
79  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Commentary, The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and 
Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2002). 
80  See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
81  Strine, supra note 79, at 1176. 
82  See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. 
83  Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1986 
(2018). 
84  Id. at 1988–89. 
85  Id. at 2016. 
86  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
87  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response Symposium, Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 (2002) (“[M]ost corporate 
law scholars embrace some variant of shareholder primacy.”); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Effi-
ciency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 640 (2006) 
(noting that current scholars have “overwhelmingly embraced” shareholder primacy); Henry 
Hansmann, supra note 2, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Lyman 
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate 
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 451 (2013) (calling shareholder primacy “dominant in 
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stance, former Chancellor William Allen has noted on several occasions that 
Revlon stands for the larger notion in Delaware corporate law that directors are 
required to maximize the value for shareholders.88 In his academic writing, the 
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, has also embraced a 
reading of Revlon consistent with the shareholder primacy model: “The under-
standing in Delaware is that Revlon could not have been more clear that direc-
tors of a for-profit corporation must at all times pursue the best interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders, and that [it] highlighted the instrumental nature of 
other constituencies and interests.”89 
II. STATES RESPOND TO UNOCAL AND REVLON 
While some states have adopted both the Unocal90 and Revlon91 standards, 
many have not.92 Beginning in the mid-1980s, top management at firms in 
troubled industries—the firms most susceptible to takeover—lobbied state leg-
islatures for the right to consider more than just shareholder profits.93 Though 
 
corporate law theory”); David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agen-
cy Costs, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 423, 454 (2016) (calling shareholder primacy the “ ‘default 
rule’ of corporate . . . ordering . . . .”). 
88  See D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Fundamental Question, 21 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 577, 594 (1998). 
89  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understand-
ing of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 771 (2015) (emphasis added); see also eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 n.105 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing to Revlon 
for the proposition that directors can consider nonshareholder interests only to the extent that 
they ultimately promote stockholder value); Strine et al., supra note 39, at 671 (“[T]he Del-
aware Supreme Court’s decision in Revlon is a stark illustration of the duty of loyalty’s re-
quirement that directors must prefer the interests of stockholders over other interests.”). 
90  See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458–59 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Un-
ocal under Florida law); NCR Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 499 (S.D. 
Ohio 1991) (applying Unocal under Maryland law); Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 F. 
Supp. 612, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Unocal under New York law); Amanda Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (applying 
Unocal under Wisconsin law); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 509–10 
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying Unocal under Illinois law); Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 
F. Supp. 1535, 1543 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (applying Unocal under Michigan law); Burcham 
v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003) (applying Unocal under Kansas law); 
Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk, 181 P.3d 773, 783 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (applying Unocal 
under Oregon law). 
91  See, e.g., O’Neill v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 910 F.2d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 1990) (ap-
plying Revlon under Texas law); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886–87 (6th Cir. 
1986) (applying Revlon under Michigan law); S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp. 
2d 1021, 1036 (D. Ariz. 2002) (applying Revlon under Arizona law); Gelco Corp. v. Conis-
ton Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845, 847 (D. Minn. 1986) (applying Revlon under Minnesota 
law). 
92  See, e.g., Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 891, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2012). 
93  See Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance? The Corporation and the 
Law: 1959–1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 102, 114 (Carl Kaysen ed. 1996). 
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academics generally saw takeovers as creating efficiency gains,94 the average 
person was unsympathetic.95 “One poll showed 58 percent of [participants] as 
thinking hostile takeovers did more harm than good . . . .”96 Voters viewed cor-
porate raiders as greedy and saw bust-up takeovers as throwing employees and 
managers out of work.97 Research has since suggested that takeovers have a 
relatively benign effect on employment,98 but public hostility at the time was 
not wholly without merit. Following T. Boone Pickens’s raid of Philips Petro-
leum in 1984, Philips eliminated nearly 3,000 jobs at its headquarters in 
Bartlesville, Oklahoma—roughly 10 percent of the town’s population.99 
Whether or not accurate, the perception that takeovers were harmful spurred 
state legislators across the country to enact anti-takeover laws designed to pro-
tect local firms and to reject the enhanced standards to which Delaware law 
subjects directors.100 
State anti-takeover laws vary in form, but nearly all of them increase direc-
tor flexibility and bargaining power in the takeover context.101 Some statutes 
explicitly precluded courts from reviewing director conduct with any greater 
scrutiny than the business judgment rule. For example, Maryland’s statute spec-
ifies that actions taken by directors “relating to or affecting an acquisition . . . 
of [a Maryland] corporation . . . may not be subject to . . . greater scrutiny than 
is applied to any other act of a director.”102 Indiana’s anti-takeover statute goes 
further by explicitly rejecting Delaware’s enhanced standards: 
[J]udicial decisions in Delaware . . . , which might otherwise be looked to for 
guidance in interpreting Indiana corporate law, including decisions . . . that im-
pose a different or higher degree of scrutiny on actions taken by directors in re-
sponse to a proposed acquisition of control of the corporation, are inconsistent 
with the proper application of the business judgment rule under this article.103 
Other state anti-takeover statutes reject Delaware’s enhanced standards 
more subtly. For instance, several states have adopted constituency statutes that 
 
94  See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 1, at 81; Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 24; Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 51, at 1161; Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 127. 
95  Roe, supra note 93, at 114–15. 
96  Id. at 114. 
97  Id. at 115. 
98  See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder 
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 46 n.4 (1991). 
99  See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1004. 
100  See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 54–55. These statutes are referred to by corporate scholars 
as the “second generation” of anti-takeover legislation. Id. at 55. The first-generation anti-
takeover statutes, enacted prior to Revlon and Unocal, generally permitted state agencies to 
directly regulate hostile takeovers; however, they were found to be an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the dormant commerce clause in 1982. Id. at 54–55; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 626, 646 (1982) (striking down the first-generation Illinois anti-takeover law). 
101  Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 467, 468–69. 
102  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(h) (West 2019). 
103  IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(f) (2019). 
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authorize, and sometimes even require,104 directors to consider non-shareholder 
interests when making corporate decisions.105 These powerful106 anti-takeover 
statutes expand the protection of the business judgment rule107 by permitting 
directors to consider not only how their decisions affect shareholders, but also 
how they affect other corporate constituencies like employees, customers, and 
the local economy.108 Constituency statutes implicitly reject Revlon’s rule that 
directors have an unqualified duty to maximize shareholder value, whether in 
the takeover context or more broadly.109 
Take Wisconsin’s constituency statute, which allows a corporate board to 
take such non-shareholder interests as employees, suppliers, customers, and the 
community as a whole into account.110 In Dixon v. Ladish Co.,111 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied the business 
judgment rule in a merger situation despite the plaintiff’s arguments that Un-
ocal and Revlon applied.112 The court stated: 
The Wisconsin Legislature enacted § 180.0827 after Revlon, and it specifically 
authorizes corporate directors to consider more than just shareholders in execut-
ing their duties. Such a provision is in direct conflict with a rule that would re-
quire directors to focus solely on maximizing value for the benefit of sharehold-
ers. Thus, Revlon cannot be the rule in Wisconsin. Therefore, in total, the court 
finds that neither Unocal nor Revlon are applicable in the case at hand and the 
business judgment rule applies . . . .113 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also found that state constituency statutes 
signal a clear departure from the shareholder primacy norm. For instance, in 
Seidman v. Central Bancorp,114 Massachusetts Superior Court applied the busi-
ness judgment rule to a board’s use of defensive tactics to ward off acquisition, 
expressly rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Delaware’s heightened stand-
ards should apply.115 Quoting from Justice Cardozo, the court explained that 
 
104  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2019). 
105  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 319 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that 
“[o]ver 30 states have adopted nonshareholder constituency statutes”). 
106  See FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE 146 
(Todd Manza ed., 2018) (explaining that a study by Christopher Geczy “found that constitu-
ency statutes truly expand[] the authority of directors” in takeover situations). 
107  Id. at 145–46 (finding that courts have interpreted constituency statutes as mandating 
application of the business judgment rule in cases that would “otherwise be subject to en-
hanced scrutiny”). 
108  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 105, at 319. 
109  See id. at 320–21. 
110  WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2019). 
111  Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2012). 
112  Id. at 751, 753. 
113  Id. at 753. 
114  Memorandum and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at *9–10, Seidman v. Cent. 
Bancorp, Inc., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 383 (2003) (Nos. 030547BLS, 030554BLS, 032287BLS), 
2003 WL 21528509. 
115  Id. at *9. 
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while the plaintiff may prefer a nuanced interpretation of the state’s anti-
takeover legislation so as to make it consistent with Delaware case law (specif-
ically Unocal), judges must be particularly cautious about invading the prov-
ince of state legislatures.116 
III. NEVADA’S STORY 
In 1991, Nevada sought to join the ranks of states that had rejected Unocal 
and Revlon117 by adopting Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 78.138.118 Nearly 
identical to the Massachusetts statute discussed above, NRS 78.138 permitted 
directors and officers of Nevada corporations to consider the interests of em-
ployees, customers, society as a whole, and the long-term interests of the cor-
poration.119 Perhaps most important, Nevada’s constituency statute also plainly 
applied in the takeover context, noting that directors may consider whether 
“these interests [are] best served by the continued independence of the corpora-
tion.”120 The stated purpose of the statue was to modernize Nevada corporate 
law with regard to takeovers and to “encourage[] those wishing to acquire [Ne-
vada] corporations to negotiate with the board of directors . . . before attempt-
ing to do so.”121 But despite these efforts to deviate from Delaware law, Neva-
da courts were reluctant to do so. 
In Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.,122 the United States District Court for 
the District of Nevada relied extensively on Delaware case law to enjoin ITT’s 
use of defensive tactics in a takeover battle.123 In 1997, Hilton Hotels Corp. an-
nounced a $6.5 billion124 tender offer for the stock of Nevada-based ITT 
Corp.125 ITT sought to block Hilton’s acquisition by staggering the board126 so 
that only one-third of ITT’s board would be up for election at any annual 
 
116  See id. at *9–10. 
117  See RESEARCH DIV., NEV. LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, SUMMARY OF LEGIS. AB 655, 66th 
Sess., at 2–3 (1991) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION], available at https://www.leg.st 
ate.nv.us/Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1991/AB655,1991pt1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2YLG-RXZH] (explaining that the bill seeks “to encourage corporate entities to 
[incorporate] in [the] [s]tate.”). 
118  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(3) (1991) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) 
(2019)). 
119  See id. 
120  Id. 
121  SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION, supra note 117, at 2. 
122  Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997). 
123  See id. at 1346–49. 
124  Edwin McDowell, Hilton Makes $6.5 Billion Bid for ITT, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 28, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/business/hilton-makes-6.5-billion-bid-for-itt.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/7MPD-DHDS]. 
125  See Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1344–45. 
126  Id. at 1344; cf. Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1352–53 (2013) (“Other than dual-class stock, which is rarely used, 
a staggered board is the most powerful takeover defense available.”). 
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shareholder meeting,127 thereby preventing Hilton from quickly gaining control 
of ITT’s board of directors.128 ITT moved to implement its plan without share-
holder approval.129 Hilton sued to enjoin ITT from doing so, arguing ITT’s plan 
breached its directors’ fiduciary duties.130 
Despite NRS 78.138, which explicitly applied to hostile acquisitions, the 
Hilton court began its analysis by noting that there was no on-point Nevada 
statutory or case law dealing with hostile takeovers or the ability of target 
boards to implement defensive measures.131 The court then turned to Delaware 
case law.132 The ITT board “argue[d] that Nevada does not follow Delaware 
case law [because NRS] [Section] 78.138 provides that a board, exercising its 
powers in good faith and with a[] view to the interests of the corporation can 
resist potential changes in control of a corporation based on the effect on con-
stituencies other than the shareholders.”133 But the court interpreted Nevada’s 
constituency statute as consistent with the Delaware’s heightened standards: 
“Delaware case law merely clarifies the basic duties established by the Nevada 
statutes,” the court noted.134 “This Court will not eliminate the principles ar-
ticulated in Unocal . . . and Revlon . . . without any indication from the Nevada 
Legislature . . . that that is the legislative intent.”135 The court permanently en-
joined ITT’s defensive measures.136 
A. The Nevada Legislature Responds 
In response to Hilton Hotels Corp., the Nevada Legislature amended the 
state’s corporate law in 1999 to make explicit that Nevada does not follow Del-
aware case law.137 The legislative intent behind the amendments was to abro-
gate the Hilton court’s use of Delaware’s enhanced standards and “preserve[] 
the application of the business judgment rule even in takeover situations” for 
Nevada corporate boards.138 The Nevada Legislature created NRS 78.139, deal-
ing specifically with takeovers.139 Much like the Maryland and Indiana anti-
 
127  See Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1344. 
128  See id. at 1345. 
129  Id. at 1344. 
130  Id. at 1345. 
131  See id. at 1346. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 1346–47. 
134  Id. at 1347. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 1352. 
137  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139 (1999) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139 
(2019)). 
138  Memorandum from John P. Fowler, Chair, Bus. Law Section, State Bar of Nev., to Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee 3–5 (Feb. 3, 1999), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/ 
Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/SB061,1999pt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T67J-R9RG]. 
139  See § 78.139. 
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takeover laws discussed above140, NRS 78.139 precluded courts from review-
ing director conduct with any greater scrutiny than the business judgment rule, 
even in takeover situations.141 The amendments also refined Nevada’s constitu-
ency statute by reinforcing the notion that corporate boards could appropriately 
resist takeover by considering non-shareholder interests and that neither Revlon 
nor Unocal apply in such cases.142 
Perhaps most significant, the 1999 amendments added a key provision into 
the constituency statute: “[d]irectors and officers are not required to consider 
the effect of a proposed corporate action upon any particular group having an 
interest in the corporation as a dominant factor.”143 This provision blatantly re-
jects the Revlon contention that corporations exist primarily to generate stock-
holder wealth and that the interests of other constituencies are subordinate to 
that concern—shareholder primacy.144 Taken to its logical end, this provision 
gives directors discretion to sacrifice the economic well-being of the corpora-
tion’s stockholders so long as it advances some non-shareholder interest they 
deem more important. This provision should have profoundly changed how 
courts understood and applied Nevada corporate governance laws; it did not. 
B. The Irresistible Pull of Delaware Law 
In 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court was called on to consider Nevada’s fi-
duciary obligations outside the takeover context in Shoen v. SAC Holding 
Corp.145 Plaintiffs alleged that the directors of AMERCO, whose primary sub-
sidiary is U-Haul International,146 had engaged in self-dealing by selling assets 
to and engaging in transactions with companies owned by an AMERCO direc-
tor.147 The question before the court was whether plaintiffs had to make a de-
mand on the board to initiate a suit against the directors, even when it was clear 
that the board would reject the demand, before proceeding with a derivative ac-
tion—a classic demand-futility case.148 This case involved an alleged conflict 
of interest and the appropriate test for determining demand futility.149 The court 
relied extensively on Delaware law150 to explain that corporate directors have a 
fiduciary duty to consider the “corporation and its shareholders[’]” interests 
 
140  See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
141  See id. § 78.139(2) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139(1) (2019)). 
142  See id § 78.139(5) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.139(4) (2019)). 
143  NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(5) (1999) (current version at NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(5) 
(2019)). 
144  See supra text accompanying notes 82–89. 
145  See Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Nev. 2006). 
146  Id. 
147  See id. at 1175–76. 
148  See id. at 1175, 1181. 
149  Id. at 1175, 1181. 
150  The Shoen court cited to Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See id. at 1178, 1180–81. 
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above all others.151 This formulation of director fiduciary duties is blatantly in-
consistent with the language of the 1999 amended constituency statute that 
stated no corporate interest dominates.152 
Over the past decade, nearly a dozen Nevada federal and state cases have 
relied on Shoen’s language to explain that shareholders’ best interests must be 
considered over the interests of anyone else under Nevada corporate law.153 For 
instance, in a 2011 opinion,154 the Nevada Supreme Court found that directors 
of a Nevada corporation breached their fiduciary duties by making unreasona-
ble purchases with corporate money.155 In so finding, the court commented in 
dicta that directors violate their fiduciary duty of loyalty by not considering the 
interest of shareholders as paramount.156 More recently, in McDonald v. Pala-
cios157 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada explained that 
directors of a Nevada corporation breach their fiduciary duties by not consider-
ing shareholder interests first.158 
Shoen’s shareholder primacy rhetoric has not determined the outcome in 
any of these cases, in the sense that the holdings did not rest on the board’s 
failure to maximize shareholder wealth, but Shoen’s impact should not be un-
derestimated. Legal rhetoric that stems from decisions like Shoen can extend 
 
151  Id. at 1178. Some scholars have argued the phrasing “corporation and its shareholders” 
embraces nonshareholder constituencies, in which case the court arguably followed Nevada 
law. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 
J. CORP. L. 309, 325 (2011); Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087, 1097–98 (2012); David Millon, Two Models of Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 526 (2011). But see David G. Yosifon, 
The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 209 (2013) (discussing and re-
jecting the view that “the corporation and its shareholders” phrasing embraces nonshare-
holder constituencies). However, in Pompei v. Clarkson, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected 
the plaintiff’s claim that directors owe corporate creditors fiduciary duties, citing the Shoen 
case and explaining, “we have held that ‘the [fiduciary] duty of loyalty requires . . . directors 
to maintain, in good faith, the corporation’s and its shareholders’ best interests over anyone 
else’s interests.’ ” Pompei v. Clarkson, No. 66459, 2016 WL 3486375, at *1–2 (Nev. June 
23, 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
152  See supra text accompanying notes 143–44. 
153  See McDonald v. Palacios, No. 2:09-cv-01470-MMD-PAL, 2016 WL 5346067, at *19 
(D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2016); FDIC v. Jacobs, No. 3:13-cv-00084-RCJ-VPC, 2014 WL 5822873, 
at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 10, 2014); FDIC v. Delaney, No. 2:13-CV-924-JCM-VCF, 2014 WL 
3002005, at *3 (D. Nev. July 2, 2014); HPEV, Inc. v. Spirit Bear Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-01548-
GMN-GWF, 2013 WL 5961120, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2013); Brinkerhoff v. Foote, No. 
68851, 387 P.3d 880, at *4 (Nev. Dec. 22, 2016) (unpublished table decision); Pompei, 2016 
WL 3486375, at *2; Hodgman v. Las Vegas Motorcoach Partners, LLC, No. 57379, 2013 
WL 1120835, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 15, 2013); In re AMERCO Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 
700–01 (Nev. 2011); Nutraceutical Dev. Corp. v. Summers, No. 53565, 373 P.3d 946, at *4 
(Nev. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Bevilaque v. Dramise, No. A-11-640026, 2014 
Nev. Dist. LEXIS 3743, at *25 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2014). 
154  Nutraceutical Dev. Corp., 373 P.3d 946. 
155  See id. at *5. 
156  See id. at *4. 
157  McDonald, 2016 WL 5346067. 
158  See id., at *19. 
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far beyond the case’s actual holding by affecting corporate norms, management 
lore, and law school pedagogy.159 Take the famed Dodge v. Ford160 case, for 
example, a case “familiar to virtually every student who has taken . . . corporate 
law.”161 The Michigan Supreme Court, in dicta, articulated the now-famous 
slogan that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed 
for that end.”162 However, as Professor Lynn Stout has emphasized, “[t]he ac-
tual holding of the case—that Henry Ford had breached his fiduciary duty to 
the Dodge brothers and that the company should pay a special dividend—was 
justified on entirely different and far narrower legal grounds.”163 That is, that 
Ford, a majority shareholder, breached his duty of good faith to his minority 
shareholders.164 Despite this, the case has been cited for nearly a century for the 
idea that directors must seek to maximize shareholder wealth above all other 
concerns.165 
C. The Nevada Legislature Responds, Again 
In response to the string of judicial decisions misinterpreting and misapply-
ing Nevada corporate law, the Nevada Legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 203 
in June 2017.166 SB 203 is the Legislature’s third attempt to distinguish Nevada 
and Delaware corporate law.167 The bill aims to clarify that “Nevada corpora-
tions should be governed by Nevada law” because “[i]t is important that . . . 
businesses that have chosen to incorporate in Nevada be able to rely on Nevada 
law.”168 This goal is most significantly embodied in SB 203’s addition of an 
express statement of legislative intent: 
The plain meaning of the laws enacted by the Legislature in this title, including, 
without limitation, the fiduciary duties and liability of the directors and officers 
of a domestic corporation set forth in NRS 78.138 and 78.139, must not be sup-
planted or modified by laws or judicial decisions from any other jurisdiction . . . 
[and] the failure or refusal of a director or officer to consider, or to conform the 
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exercise of his or her powers to, the laws, judicial decisions or practices of an-
other jurisdiction does not constitute or indicate a breach of a fiduciary duty.169 
In addition to the strong preamble, SB 203 gives directors and officers 
even greater latitude in their decision-making.170 The bill reinforces that di-
rectors “are not required to consider, as a dominant factor, the effect of a pro-
posed corporate action upon any particular group or constituency.”171 Thus, it 
repudiates Delaware’s shareholder primacy requirement as well as the language 
from Shoen that directors are to consider shareholder interests as paramount.172 
Finally, S.B. 203 expressly applies NRS 78.138 to all matters, including 
“any change or potential change in control of the corporation.”173 SB 203 al-
so evidences and reaffirms the Nevada Legislature’s rejection of Delaware’s 
standards of enhanced scrutiny.174 However, given the history described 
above,175 it is not clear that even SB 203’s direct statement will suffice to 
pull the Nevada state and federal courts away from the strong gravitational 
pull that Delaware exerts. 
IV. NEVADA COURTS’ CONTINUED RELIANCE ON DELAWARE LAW IS DEEPLY 
PROBLEMATIC 
The Nevada courts’ refusal to abide by Nevada law is troubling for a varie-
ty of reasons. First, it undermines democratic norms and the balance of power 
among the different branches of government. Second, it upsets parties’ expecta-
tions about what the law actually is. Finally, it defeats the promise of a federal 
system in which states may experiment with different laws. 
A. Reliance on Delaware Law Undermines Democratic Norms 
The American vision of representative democracy, both state and federal, is 
that free citizens have the right to vote for legislators who set the general rules 
for society.176 The legislative branch has been described as the “the heart and 
soul of our democracy, the arena where politicians and citizens most directly 
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interact over pressing concerns.”177 Representative self-government cannot and 
should not be constrained or removed at the whim of the judiciary.178 Yet that 
is what in effect happens when Nevada state and federal courts invalidate cor-
porate governance statutes by applying Delaware law. 
The object of a multi-member legislative body is to provide a setting for 
debate and deliberation;179 legislators represent individuals with diverse social 
and political views and must bargain “to produce the majority coalition neces-
sary to pass a . . . law.”180 Given that a statute reflects only what competing 
groups agree upon, the status quo generally prevails unless the public supports 
legislation.181 As the Supreme Court has stated in the federal context, “[a] stat-
ute enacted by Congress expresses the will of the people of the United States in 
the most solemn form.”182 The same holds true for the states.183 Because courts 
are not designed to be representative bodies, judge-made law may be entirely 
different from the law that would result from a democratic process.184 And to 
have broad issues of public policy decided by judges, rather than by a majority 
of Nevada’s bicameral Legislature, “is clearly to have less democracy.”185 In 
short, Nevada’s corporate governance statutes reflect value judgments made by 
the people’s representatives—expressions of the state’s aspirations. Democracy 
is best served when judges abide by the results of the democratic political pro-
cess and refrain from substituting their own views.186 
Relatedly, courts’ application of Delaware law upsets the allocation of 
power among the different branches of the government. Just as the Constitution 
vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress,187 the Nevada Constitution vests 
the authority to make law with its Legislature.188 By contrast, “[a]ccording to 
the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction, 
judges are agents or servants of the legislature” charged with interpreting the 
law, not making it.189 Of course, in the process of deciding cases, courts will 
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inevitably perform some interstitial lawmaking: judges must fill gaps in statuto-
ry language, apply statutes to new situations, and resolve genuine substantive 
disputes about the law.190 But even in those cases, judges derive the law, at 
least initially, from the democratically prescribed text. Delaware law is not, nor 
has it ever been, the governing law of Nevada. For well over two decades, the 
Nevada Legislature has vigorously sought to distinguish Nevada’s corporate 
law from Delaware’s.191 Accordingly, when Nevada state and federal courts 
apply Delaware law to Nevada companies, they usurp legislative authority; 
they are not interpreting the law, but effectively choosing their own. 
Judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere is also problematic because it 
creates “perverse incentives” for parties to look to the courts instead of the leg-
islature to fashion the law.192 This further undermines the democratic system.193 
Beyond that, judges making political judgments may undermine the trust of the 
citizenry on whose confidence the judiciary’s legitimacy depends. As the Su-
preme Court once warned, judicial “legitimacy depends on making legally 
principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is 
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”194 
B. Reliance on Delaware Law Upsets the Parties’ Expectations 
Nevada courts should apply Nevada law because those subject to the law 
must know what it proscribes. Firms look for legal certainty and predictability 
when making investment decisions. A clear legal framework permits compa-
nies to plan effectively. As Richard Fischer, the former President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, explained, “[o]perating a business under conditions of 
excessive uncertainty is like playing a game when you don’t know the rules.”195 
Nevada state and federal courts that dispense with existing corporate legislation 
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in favor of Delaware case law do just the opposite; each decision alters the ex-
isting law and leaves Nevada corporations unsure of their legal entitlements 
and responsibilities. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make mean-
ingful plans for future investment. It is also unjust because courts are effective-
ly punishing Nevada corporations for breaking rules that they did not know ap-
plied to them. 
C. Reliance on Delaware Law Undercuts the Federal System of Government 
Even if one were to accept that Delaware courts had developed the best 
possible law of fiduciary responsibility, it would be inappropriate for Nevada 
courts to apply Delaware law. Nearly a century ago, Justice Louis Brandeis 
praised state governments as “laboratories of democracy,”196 famously noting 
that the states’ independence and size allowed lawmakers to “try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”197 
From time to time, Congress has considered nationalizing corporate law, as 
it has much of securities law.198 However, it has refrained from doing so each 
time, presumably preferring to let the states set their separate courses.199 A na-
tional law would almost certainly be more efficient because corporate leaders 
and lawyers would know the law regardless of where their business is incorpo-
rated.200 Planning would be much easier, and there would be far more certainty, 
especially in small states with few corporate cases. However, there is value in 
letting states forge their own paths. When judges improperly import Delaware 
law into Nevada, they undermine Nevada’s ability to reach conclusions differ-
ent from those handed down across the country and experiment with different 
approaches to fiduciary duty and corporate litigation. If courts continue to look 
to Delaware case law instead of Nevada statutes, they will undermine the vir-
tues of federalism that Justice Brandeis extolled as one of the great strengths of 
American democracy. 
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V. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The Nevada Legislature has three times attempted to distinguish Nevada 
corporate law from Delaware’s by permitting directors of Nevada corporations 
to consider constituencies other than shareholders when making decisions on 
behalf of their corporations.201 Nonetheless, Nevada state and federal courts 
continue to cite Delaware law and insist that shareholder concerns must take 
primacy.202 This Part briefly explores three potential solutions to the problem: 
wait and see, educate Nevada’s judges, and remove judges who resort to Dela-
ware law to decide cases governed by Nevada law. 
A. Wait and See 
Nevada most recently amended its corporate statutes in 2017, and perhaps 
the third time will truly be the charm.203 Accepting for the sake of argument 
that prior efforts to deviate from Delaware corporate law were ambiguous—
giving the courts some wiggle room—a contention that seems hard to support, 
this latest effort leaves absolutely no room for doubt. Thus, the first solution is 
simply to wait until the next case is tried to see how courts respond. Nevada’s 
clear and compelling statement of legislative reasoning and statutory intent may 
finally cause judges to forsake Delaware corporate law. However, if past is pro-
logue, it is hard to be optimistic. 
B. Educate Judges on Nevada Corporate Law 
A second, more proactive solution is to educate Nevada’s state and federal 
judges on the history and substance of Nevada corporate law. Unlike Delaware, 
which has specialized courts that deal in corporate issues, Nevada’s judges are 
generalists.204 The average Nevada judge may simply not see enough cases to 
become an expert in corporate law. Judicial education can be accomplished 
through articles like this, or through corporate orientation courses for newly 
elected judges and continuing education courses for serving judges.205 For ex-
ample, the State Bar of Nevada could hold annual seminars and computer-
based trainings that delve specifically into Nevada corporate law. Another op-
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tion is for the state to craft an institute or expert body in business law to help 
judges across the state better understand the complexities involved in these 
sorts of cases. 
C. Remove Judges 
A more drastic and unlikely solution is to remove judges who do not ad-
here to Nevada’s corporate law, whether through elections or impeachment. On 
the federal level, the life tenure granted to Article III judges clearly insulates 
them from elections.206 But state judges are elected to six-year terms in Nevada, 
and judges who wish to remain on the bench after their first terms must be 
reelected.207 Nevada voters can certainly work to defeat state judges facing 
election. Take California’s 1986 judicial elections for instance, when voters 
removed from office three state supreme court justices who had been perceived 
as anti-death penalty.208 More recently, in 2010, voters in Iowa successfully 
removed three justices of the Iowa Supreme Court in a retention election fol-
lowing a unanimous opinion upholding same-sex marriage.209 
The impeachment power could also theoretically be used to reign in the ju-
diciary.210 Indeed, legislative calls to impeach judges for delivering unpopular 
decisions arise from time to time. Following Brown v. Board of Education, 
“Impeach Earl Warren” billboards and bumper-stickers littered the South.211 In 
1997, Representative Tom DeLay, the House Majority Whip, pushed to im-
peach federal judges who upheld affirmative action.212 And in 2018, Pennsyl-
vania state legislators filed a resolution to impeach four of the state’s supreme 
court justices over a disagreement on the constitutionality of the state’s con-
gressional map.213 
Despite these examples, removing judges for decisions they make on the 
bench is both unwise and likely ineffective. First, judicial independence is 
meant to ensure that “powerful people . . . cannot manipulate [the legal system] 
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to their advantage.”214 Efforts to impeach judges who make unpopular deci-
sions would undermine this independence. Second, removing judges from the 
bench is exceedingly rare. Low voter turnout is the norm in state judicial elec-
tions, and contests are uncommon.215 Moreover, the few cases where judges 
have been ousted via election have come in the wake of highly politicized and 
controversial opinions; decisions regarding the proper standards for directors 
are unlikely to incite such a reaction.216 The norm against judicial impeachment 
runs deep as well.217 In the nation’s two-hundred-and-forty-year history, the 
House of Representatives has impeached just fifteen federal judges, only eight 
of which the Senate convicted.218 More important, no federal judge has ever 
been removed from office because Congress disagreed with a decision.219 Simi-
larly, just two state judges have been impeached in the past twenty-five years, 
neither of them in Nevada.220 Thus, removing judges, whether through im-
peachment or the ballot box, is not a viable option for constraining judges in 
the corporate law context. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite three efforts to distinguish Nevada law from Delaware law and 
permit directors to consider constituencies other than shareholders, both state 
and federal courts in Nevada continue to look to Delaware law and articulate 
the shareholder primacy standard. This phenomenon is profoundly troubling 
because it undermines democracy, weakens the rule of law, and upsets the fed-
eral system where states may forge their own paths. If the Nevada courts con-
tinue to ignore Nevada law, state lawmakers can and should take steps to edu-
cate judges about Nevada corporate law and make clear that Nevada courts 
should not follow Delaware law, at least when it comes to the fiduciary duties 
of directors and shareholder primacy. 
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